IPRout

Rotate and Revoke API Keys

Rotate safely by creating a replacement key, storing it in your secret manager, deploying it to the intended service, confirming successful requests, and only then revoking the old key. Revoke immediately when a secret is exposed and investigate its usage before creating a replacement.

Last updated September 12, 2026

What is a zero-downtime rotation?

Plans with spare active-key capacity can keep old and new credentials active during the deployment window.

  • Create the replacement
  • Deploy and verify it
  • Revoke the previous key
  • Remove the old secret from storage

What if all active-key slots are used?

Choose a low-traffic window, identify an unused key to revoke, or temporarily consolidate carefully before creating the replacement.

When is immediate revocation required?

Revoke immediately after public exposure, unauthorized use, or loss of control. A normal scheduled rotation can use the overlap procedure.

How should zero-downtime key replacement be implemented?

Create a replacement with the intended origins and cap, store it securely, deploy it to the target service, and verify real requests before revoking the previous credential. Keep this responsibility close to the IPRout client so the behavior documented in Rotate and Revoke API Keys remains consistent across web requests, workers, and scheduled jobs.

How should zero-downtime key replacement be verified?

Observe activity on the new key and absence of expected traffic on the old key. Check every replica, worker, scheduled task, and rollback configuration before ending the overlap. Automate the stable cases and reserve live checks for controlled environments so verification is repeatable without consuming unnecessary production allowance.

How should zero-downtime key replacement be operated?

Use a planned review window for routine rotation and an incident procedure for exposure. Remove revoked values from secret stores, CI configuration, local files, and recovery documentation. Write down the owner and expected behavior so an alert or product change can be handled without reconstructing the original integration decisions.

Where does zero-downtime key replacement stop?

Immediate revocation is appropriate after confirmed exposure or unauthorized use. Routine rotation can overlap only when the plan has a spare active-key slot and the old secret remains controlled. Treat that limit as part of the feature contract and direct callers to the related guide when they need a different guarantee or control.

What belongs in the release review for zero-downtime key replacement?

Review the deployed implementation of Rotate and Revoke API Keys, not only a local sample. Confirm the intended endpoint, credential source, timeout, response model, and fallback from the environment that will carry real traffic. Use the verification cases above as release evidence, inspect generated browser assets and logs for secret exposure, and make sure dashboards identify the workload without storing raw credentials or unnecessary IP data. Record the configuration owner and rollback action before enabling the feature broadly.

When should zero-downtime key replacement be revisited?

Revisit zero-downtime key replacement when traffic volume, plan capacity, application ownership, deployment regions, browser origins, data retention, or the product consequence of a lookup changes. Compare the current implementation with the documented operating boundary rather than assuming the original decision still fits. Update tests and internal runbooks together, then verify the public API contract and related IPRout guides before rolling the change across every service that shares the client or account.

External references

Continue with the standards and official documentation most relevant to this guide.

Continue building with IPRout

Test the API, browse runnable examples, or return to the documentation directory.